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The method of improving the performance of continuous-variable quantum key distribution proto-
cols by post-selection has been recently proposed and verified. In continuous-variable measurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI QKD) protocols, the measurement results
are obtained from untrusted third party Charlie. There is still not an effective method of improving
CV-MDI QKD by the post-selection with untrusted measurement. We propose a method to im-
prove the performance of coherent-state CV-MDI QKD protocol by virtual photon subtraction via
non-Gaussian post-selection. The non-Gaussian post-selection of transmitted data is equivalent to
an ideal photon subtraction on the two-mode squeezed vacuum state, which is favorable to enhance
the performance of CV-MDI QKD. In CV-MDI QKD protocol with non-Gaussian post-selection,
two users select their own data independently. We demonstrate that the optimal performance of the
renovated CV-MDI QKD protocol is obtained with the transmitted data only selected by Alice. By
setting appropriate parameters of the virtual photon subtraction, the secret key rate and tolerable
excess noise are both improved at long transmission distance. The method provides an effective
optimization scheme for the application of CV-MDI QKD protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-
QKD) allows two users to achieve unconditional secure
key distribution [1, 2], which is based on the basic prin-
ciples of quantum mechanics. CV-QKD protocol based
on Gaussian modulated coherent states (GMCS) [3, 4]
has unique potentials in the high secret key rate and the
compatibility with the commercial communication sys-
tem. The experimental research of CV-QKD has grad-
ually matured in recent years [5, 6]. Recently, the field
tests of the system over commercial fibers has exceeded
50km and obtained the same order secret key rate as the
DV system [7], where the system can support the prac-
tical application within metropolitan area. The GMSC
CV-QKD protocols have been proved to be uncondition-
ally secure in theory [8–12] under some ideal assump-
tions. However, the practical security loopholes which
arise from the imperfect devices are still major obstacle
to the development of CV-QKD.
Recently, several quantum attack strategies against the
detection were proposed such as local oscillator inten-
sity and calibration attack [13–16]. Obviously, each
known loopholes of practical CV-QKD system can be
defended by corresponding countermeasure, which will
increase the complexity and reduce the reliability of the
∗ zhangyc@bupt.edu.cn
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system. Moreover, it is difficult to find an effective way
to prevent an unknown attack. The continuous-variable
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion (CV-MDI QKD) protocols [17, 18] are proposed to
counter general attacks against detection loopholes in
practical systems [19–25]. In CV-MDI QKD protocols,
the secret key between two legal parties is established by
the measurement results of an untrusted third party. On
the one hand, CV-MDI QKD protocols are immune to all
attacks on detection and therefore have higher practical
security. On the other hand, the methods [26–28] that
optimize CV-QKD protocols at the detection side are no
longer applicable in the CV-MDI QKD protocols duo to
the untrusted measurement results makes it difficult to
optimize CV-MDI protocols at the detection side.
The non-Gaussian post-selection of transmitted data
which is equivalent to the virtual photon subtraction of
coherent state source can enhance the performance of
CV-QKD protocols [29–31]. Thus, non-Gaussian post-
selection is a superior way to improve the performance
of the CV-MDI QKD protocols in practice. In this pa-
per, we propose a method to improve the performance of
coherent-state CV-MDI QKD protocols by virtual pho-
ton subtraction. Non-Gaussian post-selection is applied
on the transmitted data so that the protocols is mod-
ified without using the untrusted measurement results.
We demonstrate that the non-Gaussian post-selection
will not benefit in any case. The performance of ren-
ovated protocol is only improved in the case where Alice
uses the reasonable parameters. Moreover, Eve could
apply two independent attacks or correlated attacks on
2two quantum channels. The numerical simulation results
show that the improvement of virtual photon subtrac-
tion is still effective under the optimal correlated at-
tacks [18, 20].
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II, we pro-
pose the CV-MDI QKD protocol with virtual photon sub-
traction and derive the secret key rate of the renovated
protocol. In Sec. III, we present the performance of the
CV-MDI QKD protocol with virtual photon subtraction
through numerical simulation and the optimal scheme of
the renovated protocol. Conclusions are given In Sec. IV.
II. CV-MDI QKD PROTOCOL WITH VIRTUAL
PHOTON SUBTRACTION
In this section, we first introduce the CV-MDI QKD
with virtual photon subtraction. Then we present the se-
curity analysis of the renovated protocol where Eve im-
plements correlated attacks on two quantum channels.
The optimal correlated attacks have been demonstrated
to be more effective to CV-MDI protocols [18, 20], which
is more reasonable to evaluate the performance of the
protocol.
A. Non-Gaussian post-selection in CV-MDI QKD
Although most of the implementation of CV-MDI
QKD protocols is based on prepare-and-measure (PM)
scheme, the security of the protocol with non-Gaussian
post-selection still needs to build a entanglement-
based (EB) model. It has been confirmed that the
preparation-measurement (PM) scheme of non-Gaussian
post-selection is equivalent to the entanglement-based
scheme of realistic photon subtraction with an ideal pho-
ton number resolving detector [30, 32]. In order to make
the key parameters of the post-selection easier to under-
stand, we show the EB scheme which is easier to security
analysis in Fig. 1.
In the EB scheme, the coherent state is prepared by
applying heterodyne detection on one mode of the two-
mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state. We will show
the equivalence between non-Gaussian post-selection and
photon subtraction on one mode of her TMSV state [30].
The mode A4 with k photons subtraction is described by
ρkA4 =
∫ ∫ PkPS(k|xA1 ,pA1 )
Pk
PS
PxA1pA1
dxA1dpA1
∣∣√TPSα〉 〈√TPSα|, (1)
and
P kPS (k |xA1 , pA1 ) =
∣∣〈k ∣∣√1− TPSα〉∣∣2, (2)
where α =
√
2λ(xA1 + ipA1), λ =
√
V−1
V+1 , V is the vari-
ance of the TMSV state, TPS is transmittance of pho-
ton subtraction, k is the number of photon subtraction,
P kPS (k |xA1 , pA1 ) is the success probability of k-photon
subtraction with Alice’s heterodyne measurement result
(xA1 , pA1) and PxA1pA1 is the two-dimensional Gaus-
sian distribution of Alices heterodyne measurement re-
sult (xA1 , pA1).
Then we show the case where photon subtraction is
not implemented (TPS = 1), the A4 mode is described
by
ρA4 =
∫ ∫
PxA1pA1dxA1dpA1 |α〉 〈α|. (3)
By Comparing ρA4 with ρ
k
A4
, the photon subtracted
TMSV state is achieved by selecting Alice’s heterodyne
measurement result (xA1 , pA1) with a probability Ps =
P kPS (k |xA1 , pA1 ). According to the equivalence relation
between Alice’s heterodyne measurement results in the
EB scheme and Gaussian modulation data in the PM
scheme, the corresponding non-Gaussian post-selection
probability of each pair modulation data is derived.
CV-MDI QKD system contains two sources located at
Alice and Bob’s sides respectively, and the influence of
each side’s non-Gaussian post-selection should be ana-
lyzed independently. To know the influence of one-side
operation on the other side’s data, we first assume the
non-Gaussian post-selection is only implemented by Al-
ice. Alice selects her data (xA, pA) with a selection prob-
ability PAS = P
k
PS (k |xA, pA ) and the data of Bob is
also selected by the probability PAS . Then the original
Gaussian state of Alice will be transformed into a non-
Gaussian state as Eq. 1. Since there is no correlation
between Alice and Bob’s data, the selection probability
PAS which only depends on (xA, pA) is independent on
Bob’s data. When Bob select his data with selection
probability PAS as if he select a group of Gaussian data
randomly. As a consequence, the original TMSV state
will not change. It means that Alice or Bob can select her
or his transmitted data independently without change of
the other one’s. As a result, there are three CV-MDI
QKD schemes with non-Gaussian post-selection. We in-
troduce steps of the CV-MDI QKD with non-Gaussian
post-selection based on PM scheme as follows and the
equivalent EB scheme is shown in Fig 1:
Step1: Alice and Bob randomly select Gaussian-
distribution data pair {xA, pA} and {xB1 , pB1} with vari-
ance VA − 1 and VB − 1, respectively. Then they use
these data to modulate x quadrature and p quadrature of
their coherent state. The Gaussian-modulated coherent
states are send to Charlie through the quantum channels
controlled by Eve.
Step2: Charlie receives the two modes and input the
two modes through a abeam splitter (50:50). He applies
homodyne detections on the two output modes and gets
the measurement results of x quadrature and p quadra-
ture {xC , pC} ,which are announced to Alice and Bob
through classical channels.
Step3: Alice keeps her data unchanged. Bob uses
xB = xB1 + µxC and pB = pB1 − µpC to modify his
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Entanglement-based scheme of CV-MDI QKD with virtual photon subtraction. EPR is the two-mode
squeezed vacuum state. All green detectors represent homodyne detection. PNR is the photon number resolving detector. TA
(TB) is the channel transmittance from Alice (Bob) to Charlie. D is the displacement operation of Bob. QM is the quantum
memory.
data, where µ is the parameter used to optimize Bob’s
estimator. This process is similar to the approach in the
two-way CV-QKD protocols [33–38].
Step4: Before the conventional post processing, Alice
and Bob select a part of data with probability PAS and
PBS respectively(when Alice or Bob does not use non-
Gaussian post-selection, PAS or P
B
S is set to 100%), and
reveal the selection results. And they should keep the
data which is selected by both of them. These data are
used to implement the reconciliation and privacy ampli-
fication through the classical channel.
Because the security analysis of CV-MDI QKD pro-
tocol based on GMCS has been demonstrated to be the
well-known one-way CV QKD protocol using coherent
states and heterodyne detection [17], the optimality of
Gaussian attack [8, 9] is still applicable in this case. We
will lower-bound the secret key rate when we regard the
quantum state finally shared by Alice and Bob as a Gaus-
sian state. Although, the original Gaussian-modulated
coherent state will be transformed into a non-Gaussian
state after non-Gaussian post-selection, the quantum
states ρA1A4 and ρB2B5 should still be used as Gaussian
states which have the same covariance matrix to estimate
the lower bound of secret key rate of the renovated pro-
tocol.
B. SECRET KEY RATE OF CV-MDI QKD WITH
VIRTUAL PHOTON SUBTRACTION
We have introduced that the EB scheme with virtual
photon-subtraction and PM scheme with non-Gaussian
selection are equivalent. We use the EB scheme which
is shown in Fig 1 to derive secret key rate. Although
there are three EB schemes of CV-MDI QKD with non-
Gaussian selection, the security analysis of three cases
can be drawn through an unified form of Alice and Bob’s
covariance matrix. The covariance matrixes of their
sources can be described by
γA1A4 =
[
VA1I CA1A4σz
CA1A4σz VA4I
]
, (4)
and
γB2B5 =
[
VB2 I CB2B5σz
CB2B5σz VB5 I
]
, (5)
where I is two-dimensional identity matrix and σz =[
1 0
0 −1
]
.
The elements of Alice’s covariance matrix are [30]
VA1 = 2V
′
A − 1,
CA1A4 = 2
√
TPSλAV
′
A,
VA4 = 2TPSλ
2
AV
′
A + 1,
V ′A =
k+1
1−TPSλ2A
.
(6)
The way of deriving the elements of Bob’s covariance
matrix is same to the Eq. (6). All the cases of the mod-
ified protocol can be obtained by setting corresponding
parameters (TPS and k) of above covariance matrixes.
The selection probability of Bob and Alice only depend
on their data, one-side non-Gaussian selection will not
have impact on the other, which is also consistent with
the above derivation.
Here, we assume Eve implements the correlated at-
tacks [18, 20, 40] on two quantum channels. Then the
modes Cx and Cp of Charlie are
4Cx =
1√
2
(A5 −B6)
=
1√
2
(√
TAA4 −
√
TBB5
)
+
1√
2
(√
1− TAE2 −
√
1− TBE3
)
,
Cp =
1√
2
(A5 +B6)
=
1√
2
(√
TAA4 +
√
TBB5
)
+
1√
2
(√
1− TAE2 +
√
1− TBE3
)
.
(7)
where TA (TB) is the transmittance of the channel from
Alice (Bob) to Charlie. Both channel loss of Alice and
Bob are α = 0.2dB/km, the transmittance of the channel
are TA = 10
−αLAC/10 and TB = 10
−αLBC/10 respectively.
After the displacement of Bob, the two quadratures of B1
are
B1x = B2x + µCx
=
(
B2x − µ
√
TB
2
B5x
)
+ µ
√
TA
2
A4x
+
µ√
2
(√
1− TAE2x −
√
1− TBE3x
)
,
B1p = B2p + µCp
=
(
B2p − µ
√
TB
2
B5p
)
+ µ
√
TA
2
A4p
+
µ√
2
(√
1− TAE2p −
√
1− TBE3p
)
.
(8)
It has been demonstrated that the CV-MDI QKD pro-
tocol could be seen as the one-way CV QKD protocol
using coherent states and heterodyne detection by as-
suming that both Bobs source and the displacement op-
eration inside himself are untrusted [17]. Then according
to Eqs. (4), (5) and (8), the final covariance matrix of
ρA1B1 is given by
γA1B1 =
[
VA1I
√
TCA1A4σz√
TCA1A4σz [T (VA4 − 1) + 1 + T ǫ′] I
]
,
(9)
to simplify the equation, the transmittance and the ex-
cess noise are given by
T =
TA
2
µ2
ǫ′ = 1 +
1
TA
[TB (χB − 1) + TAχA − CE ]
+
1
TA
[√
2
µ
√
VB5 − 1−
√
TB (VB2 + 1)
]
,
(10)
where CE =
2
TA
√
(1− TA) (1− TB) 〈E2xE3x〉 (X
quadrature) or CE = − 2TA
√
(1− TA) (1− TB) 〈E2pE3p〉
(P quadrature) is the noise contribution from the corre-
lation of Eve’s two modes.By setting µ =
√
2(VB5−1)
TB(VB2+1)
,
the total excess noise is minimized as
ǫ′ = ǫA +
1
TA
[TB (ǫB − 2) + 2] . (11)
Combined with the above analysis, the secret key rate
here is equivalent to the conventional one-way CV-QKD
with coherent state and heterodyne detection. The in-
crease in asymptotic rate also applies to non-asymptotic
rate. For simplicity, the asymptotic secret key rate is cal-
culated in this paper. The reverse reconciliation which
has higher secret key rate than direct one is used in the
following analysis. Thus the asymptotical secret key rate
against collective attacks for reverse reconciliation [39] is
derived as
KPS = P [βI (A : B)− S(E : B)] , (12)
where β is reconciliation efficiency, P = PAS · PBS , PAS
(PBS ) is the success probability of non-Gaussian post-
selection with photon subtraction number k in Alice’s
(Bob’s) side, I (A : B) is classical mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob and S(E : B) = S (E) − S (E |B )
is quantum mutual information between Eve and Bob.
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is cal-
culated by
I (A : B) = log (VAx)− log
(
VAx|Bx
)
= log

 VA1+1
VA1−
C2
A1B1
VB1
+1

 , (13)
VA1 , CA1B1 and VB1 are corresponding elements of co-
variance matrix in Eq. (6). Eve can purify the whole sys-
tem ρA1B1 , so we can derive S (E) = S(A1B1). S(A1B1)
which is a function of the symplectic eigenvalue λ1 and
λ2 of γA1B1
S (A1B1) =
2∑
i=1
G (λi). (14)
where G(λi) =
λi+1
2 log2
(
λi+1
2
)
+ λi−12 log2
(
λi−1
2
)
.
After Bob applies heterodyne detection on mode B1,
the system A1E is pure. Eve’s condition entropy
S(E |xB1 , pB1 ) = S(A1 |xB1 , pB1 ). S(A1 |xB1 , pB1 ) is a
function of the symplectic eigenvalue λ3 of γ
xB1 ,pB1
A1
S(A1 |xB1 , pB1 ) = G (λ3) , (15)
and
γ
xB1 ,pB1
A1
= γA1 − TCA1B1(γB1 + I)−1CTA1B1 . (16)
5III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION AND
ANALYSES
In CV-MDI QKD protocols, the performance of the
asymmetric case (TA 6= TB) has been proven to be su-
perior to the symmetric case (TA = TB). It means that
when Charlie’s position is far away from Bob, the total
transmission distance will drop rapidly to a few kilome-
ters. When the distance between Charlie and Bob is 0,
the transmittance distance of protocol will increase to
the maximal distance with same parameters [17]. Be-
cause the longer transmission distance is more suitable
for point-to-point applications, the extreme asymmetric
case is first utilized to simulate the secret key rate and
tolerable excess noise. The secret key rate indicates the
amount of the secret key distilled in one optical pulse
and the tolerable excess noise indicates the amount of the
excess noise which reduces the secret key rate to 0. Ac-
cording to the Eq. 10, the correlated attacks degenerate
into two independent attacks in the extreme asymmetric
scheme. By comparing these two crucial performances of
CV-QKD, we can search the best scheme of three cases.
A. THE PERFORMANCE IN THE EXTREME
ASYMMETRIC SCHEME
In CV-MDI QKD protocols, measurement results from
Charlie will be used by Alice and Bob to generate secret
key. Before the reconciliation, Bob uses xB = xB1+µxC
and pB = pB1−µpC to modify his data. By this step, the
information of Bob is almost removed from the measure-
ment results. The remaining parts only include noise and
part of Alice’s information. As a result, the virtual pho-
ton subtraction applied by Alice with appropriate param-
eters may improve the performance of CV-MDI QKD.
The non-Gaussian post-selection success probability is
determined by the equivalent numbers k and transmit-
tance TPS of virtual photon subtraction. We illustrate
the effect of the non-Gaussian post-selection on the per-
formance of the CV-MDI QKD protocol by the secret
key rate and tolerable excess noise. We consider the
performance with different parameters k and the corre-
sponding optimal TAPS which is shown in Fig 7(b). The
PLOB bound [41] which is the secret-key capacity of the
lossy channel indicates the maximum rate achievable by
any optical implementation of QKD. The comparison of
the performance between various 1,2,3-photon subtrac-
tion protocols and the PLOB bound is shown in Fig 2(a).
The numerical simulation shows that the secret key rate
of the various 1,2,3-photon subtraction protocols is two
orders lower than the PLOB bound. That means that
the MDI node can not be an active repeater even in the
improved CV-MDI protocol. In addition to the PLOB
bound, the non-Gaussian post-selection with k = 1 gets
the furthest maximal transmittance distance (the secret
key rate higher than 1e-8 is reserved) and the highest
secret key rate at long transmittance distance. The tol-
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FIG. 2. (Color online) (a) The maximal secret key rate with
optimal TAPS in (b) by setting different k vs PLOB bound of
equivalent photon subtraction only in Alice’s side. (b) The
maximal tolerable noise with optimal TAPS by setting different
k of equivalent photon subtraction only in Alice’s side. In the
simulations, the variance of TMSV state is VA = VB = 40,
the excess noise is ǫ = 0.002, the reconciliation efficiency is
β = 0.95.
erable noise with three k is shown in Fig 2(b), the reno-
vated protocol with k = 1 still performs better than other
cases.
Although the secret key rate at long distance is en-
hanced, the short-distance performance is even worse
than the original protocol with optimal TAPS . The first
reason is the low success probability of the photon sub-
traction, which can not exceed 25% under the parameters
we used in this work. Another reason is that the photon
subtraction will equivalently adjust the modulation vari-
ance. The optimal modulation variance is not a constant
at different distances. To extend the transmittance dis-
tance, the photon subtraction is applied to optimize the
modulation variance at long distance. As a result, the
optimal modulation variance for long distance does not
apply to short distance. Combining these two reasons,
the secret key rate at short distance is almost two orders
lower than the value at long distance. According to the
above analysis, the virtual photon subtraction of Alice
improves the performance of the renovated protocol at
long transmittance distance where the number of photon
subtraction is k = 1 for the optimal choice of TAPS.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) The maximal secret key rate with
optimal TBPS by setting different k of equivalent photon sub-
traction only in Bob’s side. In the simulations, the variance
of TMSV state is VA = VB = 40, the excess noise is ǫ = 0.002,
the r conciliation efficiency is β = 0.95.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) The comparison of maximal secret key
rate among the original CV-MDI QKD, the CV-MDI QKD
with virtual photon subtraction in only Alice’s side, Bob’s
side and both their side. In the simulations, the variance of
TMSV state is VA = VB = 40, the excess noise is ǫ = 0.002,
the reconciliation efficiency is β = 0.95.
By assuming Bob’s source and the displacement oper-
ation are untrusted, the covariance matrix of CV-MDI
QKD is equivalent to the one-way form. The secret key
rate which is calculated from the equivalent one-way form
is independent on Bob’s source. Thus, the virtual pho-
ton subtraction in Bob’s side has little effect on the final
secret key rate. On the other hand, Bob choose an op-
timal µ to make his final estimator of Alice’s data more
precise, but the virtual photon subtraction still reduces
T = TA2 µ
2 which is considered to be controlled by Eve
and leads to a slight decline in performance. By the same
way as above, we can get the optimal TBPS with different
k. In the case of the optimal TBPS , when the value of k
increase, the value of T will drop accordingly. Thus when
virtual photon subtraction is only in Bob’s side, the se-
cret key rate and tolerable excess noise will both be re-
duced. Moreover, the selection probability can not reach
100%, which is also the cause of the performance decline.
The secret key rate curves with different k and optimal
TBPS are compared in Fig 3. The simulation results are
consistent with the above theoretical analysis. As a re-
sult, compared to the renovated protocol, the original
protocol can achieve higher secret key rate and tolerable
excess noise. In summary, Bob’s photon subtraction will
not bring any benefit.
According to the results of above two simulations, the
performance is improved when virtual photon subtrac-
tion is only in Alice’s side at long distance. Because the
two sources are independent, the impact of Alice and
Bob’s photon subtraction will independently act on the
final secret key rate. Then we compare the performance
of scheme with two 1-photon subtraction in each side
to the scheme with virtual photon subtraction only in
Alice or Bob’s side. The comparison of secret key rate
shown in Fig 4 indicates that we cannot enhance the se-
cret key rate higher by using two 1-photon subtraction
in each side than the scheme with 1-photon subtraction
only in Alice’s side. The benefit of Alice’s virtual photon
subtraction is offset by the side effect of Bob’s virtual
photon subtraction. The simulation results show the im-
provement of Alice’s photon subtraction and the damag-
ing effect of Bob’s photon subtraction. In summary, the
performance of the modified protocol is only improved
by Alice using virtual photon subtraction with reason-
able parameters.
B. SYMMETRIC SCHEME UNDER THE
OPTIMAL CORRELATED ATTACKS
Although the performance of the symmetric CV-MDI
QKD protocols is better at long distance, the symmetric
case has potentials in short-range network applications
where the relay should be in the middle of Alice and
Bob. In the symmetric scheme, the correlated attacks are
not equal to two independent attacks. The covariances of
Eve’s two modes could be any value, which should satisfy
the uncertainty principle [42]. The optimal correlated
attacks are proven to be the negative ERP attack where
the ancillas are maximally entangled and negatively re-
lated [20]. The performance of the original protocols and
the renovated protocols under two kinds of attacks are
compared in the Fig 5.
Because CV-MDI protocols have been showed to be
vulnerable to correlated attacks on the link, the secret
key rate of the original protocol and renovated proto-
col under the optimal attacks are both lower than the
key rate under two independent attacks case. No matter
under either attacks, the transmittance distance is still
enhanced by the virtual photon subtraction. As a result,
the virtual photon subtraction is also effective to improve
the long-distance performance of CV-MDI protocols un-
der the optimal attacks.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The comparison of maximal secret
key rate among the original CV-MDI QKD and the CV-MDI
QKD with non-Gaussian post-selection under two indepen-
dent attacks and the optimal correlated attacks. In the sim-
ulations, the variance of TMSV state is VA = VB = 10000,
the excess noise is ǫ = 0.002, the reconciliation efficiency is
β = 0.95.
IV. CONCLUSION
The CV-MDI QKD protocols, where the secret key
between two legal parties is established by the measure-
ment results of an untrusted third party, are impossi-
ble to improve the performance at the detection side.
We propose a method to improve the performance of
coherent-state CV-MDI QKD protocols by non-Gaussian
post-selection of transmitted data. Non-Gaussian post-
selection is a practical way to apply ideal photon subtrac-
tion which can equivalently enhance the entanglement of
TMSV state. We prove that the virtual photon subtrac-
tion of Alice and Bob’s transmitted data are independent
of each other. For CV-MDI QKD with virtual photon
subtraction used by Bob, the performance is decreased
due to the lower equivalent channel transmittance and
the limited success probability. The parameters of non-
Gaussian post-selection which is used by Alice can be
adjust flexibly to improve the secret key rate and toler-
able excess noise at long transmission distance. In sum-
mary, we provide an efficient optimization method for
long-range application of CV-MDI QKD.
Note added. Shortly after the submission of our
manuscript, an independent work [43] has been posted
on arXiv. This work studied the performance of the CV-
MDI QKD protocol with photon subtraction only used
by Alice.
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APPENDIX A: CALCULATION OF THE
COVARIANCE MATRIX
A TMSV state is generated by squeezing a two mode
vacuum state |ψ〉A1A2 . The two mode squeezing operator
is STMS (r) = exp
[
r
(
aˆ1aˆ2 − aˆ†1aˆ†2
)/
2
]
, where aˆ1 and aˆ
†
1
( aˆ2 and aˆ
†
2 ) represent the annihilation and creation op-
erator of modes A1 and A2, r is the squeezing parameter.
Thus the TMSV state |ψ〉A1A2 can be described as
|ψ〉A1A2 = STMS (r) |0, 0〉
=
√
1− λ2
∞∑
n=0
λn |n, n〉, (17)
where λ = tanh r, |n, n〉 = |n〉A1 ⊗ |n〉A2 and |n〉 is Fock
state.
Photon subtraction is implemented by a beam splitter
(transmittance T ) and a photon number resolving detec-
tor shown in Fig. 6. The mode A2 of the TMSV state
is split into A3 and A4 by the beam splitter. Then the
TMSV state |ψ〉A1A2 is transformed into a tripartite state|ψ〉A1A3A4
|ψ〉A1A2A3 = UBS (T ) |TMSV 〉 |0〉 , (18)
The photon number resolving detector is described by
a Positive Operator-Valued Measurement (POVM) oper-
ators MkPS = |k〉 〈k|. |ψ〉A1A2A3 with k photons subtrac-
tion can be written as
|ψ〉kA1A2A3 =
MkPS |ψ〉A1A2A3√
〈ψ|A1A2A3Mps|ψ〉A1A2A3
, (19)
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FIG. 7. (Color online) (a) The success probability P kS of
virtual photon subtraction by setting different transmittance
TPS. (b) The optimal T
A
PS of virtual photon subtraction for
the maximal secret key rate by setting different k. In the
simulations, the variance of TMSV state is VA = VB = 40,
the excess noise is ǫ = 0.002 and the reconciliation efficiency
is β = 0.95.
where
√
〈ψ|A1A2A3Mps|ψ〉A1A2A3 = P kPS is success prob-
ability of subtracting k photons also the probability of
detecting k photons on mode A3 on the photon number
resolving detector.
When Alice replaces the original source by the photon
subtracted TMSV state, she first prepares a TMSV state
and applies the heterodyne detection on mode A1. There
is a one-to-one correspondence between preparing a co-
herent state and measuring one mode of the TMSV state.
The mode A2 is separated into two modes A3 and A4 by
a beam splitter and mode A3 is measured by photon sub-
traction MkPS . The mode with k-photon subtraction is
described by
ρkA4 = PA1xA1pdA1xdA1p
∣∣∣√TPSα〉〈√TPSα∣∣∣ , (20)
where α =
√
2λ(A1x + iA1p), PA1xA1p is the two-
dimension Gaussian distribution of Alice’s measurement
result (A1x, A1p) and the success probability of k-photon
subtraction with Alice’s heterodyne measurement result
is P kPS (k |A1x, A1p )
P kPS (k |A1x, A1p ) = exp
[
− (1− TPS)λ
2
2
(
A21x +A
2
1p
)]
·
[
(1− TPS)λ2
2
(
A21x +A
2
1p
)]k/
k!,
(21)
Then the covariance matrix of photon subtracted
TMSV state can be described by
γA1A4 =
[
VA1I CA1A4σz
CA1A4σz VA4I
]
, (22)
Because of the symmetry of covariance matrix, we can
get the matrix element by only calculating the variance
and covariance of quadrature A4x
VA1 = 2
∫ ∫
A21xP (A1x, A1p, A4x) dA1xdA1pdA4x − 1
CA1A4 =
√
2
∫ ∫
A1xA4xP (A1x, A1p, A4x) dA1xdA1pdA4x
VA4 =
∫ ∫
A24xP (A1x, A1p, A4x) dA1xdA1pdA4x,
(23)
where
P (A1x, A1p, A4x) =
P kPS (k |A1x, A1p )
P kPS
· PA1xA1p
∣∣∣〈A4x ∣∣∣√TPSα〉∣∣∣2,
(24)
and
P kPS =
1− λ2
1− TPSλ2
[
λ2 (1− TPS)
1− TPSλ2
]k
. (25)
APPENDIX B: THE OPTIMAL
TRANSMITTANCE OF PHOTON
SUBTRACTION’S BEAM SPLITTER
The success probability of virtual photon subtraction
PAS is displayed as a function of transmittance T
A
PS in
Fig. 7(a) when the variance of original TMSV state is
constant. As a result, the transmittance TAPS has ef-
fect on the secret key rate KS = βI (B : A) − S(E : B)
without consideration of success probability and the suc-
cess probability of non-Gaussian post-selection simulta-
neously. The final secret key rate is dependent on both
above parts. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the secret
key rate KS and the success probability P
A
S to maximize
the final secret key rate. By comparing the secret key rate
with different transmittance TAPS , the optimal transmit-
tance TAPS with differen k is illustrated in Fig 7(b).
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